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Abstract
This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Markovian equilib-
rium in models with non-paternalistic altruism extending to one generation ahead.
When utility is non-separable, we show that each equilibrium savings policy cor-
respondence is increasing everywhere and single-valued, except perhaps on a
countable number of points. It is also upper hemi-continuous where it is sin-
gle valued. When utility is separable, we show that the equilibrium is unique,
increasing, and continuous, and we provide an algorithm converging uniformly to
the equilibrium.
1 INTRODUCTION
This paper presents important results on existence and characterization of Markov
equilibrium for a broad class of models with intergenerational altruism fre-
quently used in the macroeconomic literature. In these models, parents are
assumed to have a simple non-paternalistic utility, as each generation derives
utility from its own consumption and the utility of the next generation.1 Mod-
els with simple non-paternalistic altruism are widely used (Barro [1], Barro and
Becker[2], Loury [8]), but results establishing existence and characterization of
equilibrium are surprisingly few and incomplete. Most important is the seminal
work of Ray [10] demonstrating the existence of an indirect utility function and
a saving policy such that it is optimal for each generation to follow that partic-
ular policy, providing its descendants use the same policy, and that the indirect
utility function is the same for all generations. In addition, the optimal saving
policy is shown to be an increasing function of current endowments. Ray[10]
focuses on existence, and there is no characterization of the set of equilibria,
no indications on how to compute them, and no conditions under which the
equilibrium can be shown to be unique.2 This paper addresses these concerns.
2 THE NON-SEPARABLE CASE
Time is discrete and indexed by t, and there is a continuum of agents each living
for one period. An agent in period t divides his output between consumption
and investment. At the end of the period, the agent gives birth to a new
agent and dies. Output available to the next generation is obtained through a
production technology represented by the function f exhibiting constant returns
to scale in private inputs, and production takes place in the context of perfectly
competitive markets.
Assumption 1. The production function f is (i) continuous, strictly
increasing, continuously di¤erentiable, and strictly concave, (ii)3 such that there
exists k > 0 with f(k) · k, and (iii) such that f(0) = 0 and limk!0f1(0) =1.
Consider a parent in period t maximizing:
u(ct; Vt+1);
where 0 · ct · f(kt) is personal consumption, Vt+1 is the descendant’s utility,
and kt+1 = f(kt)¡ ct is saving (bequest).
Assumption 2. The utility function u(c; V ) : R2+ ! R is (i) continu-
ous, strictly increasing, concave, and continuously di¤erentiable, (ii) such that
limc!0 u
0
(c) =1, (iii)4 supermodular in (c; V ), and (iv) there exists a constant
M(k) such that u(k;M(k)) ·M(k):
1We do not consider more complex forms of non-paternalistic altruism allowing for depen-
dency on utilities of many future generations.
2Sundaram [12] raises questions as to the validity of Ray’s proof.
3This implies that the state-space can be restricted to be the compact set K = [0; k]:
4This simply requires that c and V exhibit some weak complementarity.
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Following Ray [10], we de…ne a competitive Markov equilibrium as a value
function v¤ : K! R and a policy h¤ : K! K such that:
v¤(k) = sup
0·k0·f(k)
uff(k)¡ k0; v¤(k0)g; (1)
and,
h¤(k) = arg max
0·k0·f(k)
uff(k)¡ k0; v¤(k0)g:
Loury[8] provides a proof of existence and uniqueness of v¤ using the con-
traction mapping theorem, but makes the strong assumption that u2(c; V ) < 1,
which rules out many utility functions.5 We provide a more general proof,
searching for v¤ in the space G of functions V : K ! R; increasing, bounded
by M(k), and upper semi-continuous (usc). G is endowed with the partial
pointwise order ·, and T is the Bellman’s operator de…ned by:
TV (k) = sup
0·k0·f(k)
uff(k)¡ k0; V (k0)g; for any V 2 G:
Lemma 1 (G;·) is a complete lattice. T maps G into itself and is monotone.
Proof. The lower envelope of a family of usc, bounded by M(k), and
increasing functions is usc, increasing and bounded by M(k), and G has a top
element (M(k)). By Davey and Priestley [7] (Theorem 2.16 page 34), G is a
complete lattice. That T is a self map follows from Berge[3] (Theorem 2 page
116). Monotonicity is easy to verify.
Noting that TM(k) ·M(k), the following result is a consequence of Tarski’s
…xed-point theorem.
Proposition 2 The set of value functions V satisfying Bellman’s equation (1)
TV = V associated with the agent’s decision problem is a non-empty complete
lattice with maximal and minimal …xed points.
In addition,
Corollary 3 The maximal and minimal …xed points can respectively be obtained
as the limits of the sequences fTnM(k)g1n=0 and fTn0g1n=0.
Given any v¤ in the lattice of …xed points satisfying Bellman’s equation, we
turn to the characterization of the optimal policy correspondence. A correspon-
dence ¡(t) is said to be strongly increasing in t if, for all t1 ¸ t2 and yi 2 ¡(ti),
y1 ¸ y2.
Proposition 4 For any v¤ satisfying Bellman’s equation, the optimal policy
correspondence argmax0·k0·f(k) uff(k)¡k0; v¤(k0)g (i) is a nonempty compact
and subcomplete sublattice of Rn, (ii) is strongly increasing in k, and (iii) has
a greatest and a least element, both increasing in k: Further (iv) the maximal
selection of the optimal policy correspondence is the only usc selection, and
(v) maximal and minimal selections coincide on all points where the maximal
selection is continuous.
5That assumption holds for separable utility of the form u(c) + ¯V with 0 < ¯ < 1.
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3 THE SEPARABLE CASE
In the separable case, we are able to demonstrate existence and uniqueness of
competitive equilibrium for a large class of environments allowing for distortions
in the form of taxes and externalities. Agents are represented by the separable
utility function:
v(ct; Vt+1) = u(ct) + ¯Vt+1; with 0 < ¯ < 1:
Assumption 3. The utility function u : R+ ! R is (i) continuously di¤er-
entiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave, and (ii) such that limc!0 u
0
(c) =
1.
With the capital-labor ratio denoted by k; and the per-capita counterpart
of this measurement by K, consider a technology represented by the function
f(k;K); with constant returns to scale in private inputs but allowing for ex-
ternalities. Each agent assumes that the aggregate endogenous state vari-
able evolves according to a continuous function K
0
= h(K), and a govern-
ment taxes all income at the rate t1(K) and transfers the lump sum amount
t2(K) to each household. With income before taxes and transfers equal to
f(K;K) + (k ¡K)f1(K;K); an agent’s bequest to the next generation is:
k0 = (1¡ t1(K))[f(K;K) + (k ¡K)f1(K;K)] + t2(K)¡ c:
Assumption 4. The production function f(k;K) (i) is continuous, strictly
increasing, continuously di¤erentiable in its two arguments, and strictly concave
in its …rst argument, (ii) satis…es f(0; K) = 0 and limk!0f1(k;K) = 1 for
all K, and (iii) there exists k > 0 such that f(k; k) · k. The functions
governing taxes and transfers ti(K); i = 1; 2;are continuous and increasing, and
H(K) = (1¡ t1(K))f1(K;K) is weakly decreasing in K.
A competitive Markov equilibrium is a value function v¤ : K2 ! R and an
equilibrium investment policy h¤ : K! K such that:
v¤(k;K) = sup
c2¡(k;K)
fu(c) + ¯[v¤((1¡ t1(K))[f(k;K)
+(k ¡K)f1(k;K)] + t2(K)¡ c; h¤(K))]g; (2)
and,
h¤(K) = f(K;K)¡ c¤(K;K);
where,
c¤(k;K) = arg max
c2¡(k;K)
fu(c) + ¯[v¤((1¡ t1(K))[f(k;K)
+(k ¡K)f1(k;K)] + t2(K)¡ c; h¤(K))]g;
and,
¡(k;K) = [0; (1¡ t1(K))[f(k;K) + (k ¡K)f1(k;K)] + t2(K)]:
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Consider the complete metric space of bounded, continuous, real-valued
functions v : K2 ! R equipped with the sup norm, and its subset W of func-
tions that are also weakly increasing and concave in their …rst argument. The
following is a standard result of the dynamic programming literature (see for
instance Stokey, Lucas and Prescott [11]).
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 3 and 4, there exists a unique v¤ inW that
satis…es equation (2). Moreover, v¤ is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
its …rst argument, and the optimal policy c¤(K;K) is single valued, continuous,
increasing and lies in the interior of [0; f(k)].
Following Coleman [4], we construct a nonlinear operator A from the Euler
equation as follows:
u0((Ac)(K)) = ¯u0[c(f(K;K)¡ (Ac)(K))] ¤H(f(K;K)¡Ac(K)):
We look for an equilibrium, a strictly positive …xed point of A, in the complete
lattice E of functions c : K! K, endowed with the pointwise partial order ·,
such that 0 · c(K) · f(K) and c and f ¡ c are weakly increasing.6
Proposition 6 Under Assumption 3 and 4, there exists a unique equilibrium,
which can be obtained as the uniform limit of the sequence fAnFg1n=0.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper provides existence and characterization results for models with non-
paternalistic altruism limited to the next generation. In models where utility is
separable, which are widely used in the literature, we prove uniqueness of equi-
librium and construct an algorithm converging uniformly to the unique equilib-
rium. The equilibrium policy (whether consumption of savings) is continuous
and increasing. We show that these results hold for a large class of economies
with distortions such as taxes and externalities. When utility is non-separable,
we prove existence but are unable to establish uniqueness of equilibrium. How-
ever, we show that each equilibrium savings correspondence is increasing and,
except perhaps on a countable number of points, singled valued and continuous.
In both cases, the methodology is order-based;7 existence of equilibrium relies
on Tarski’s theorem, and lattice theory helps characterize the properties of these
equilibria.
5 PROOFS
Corollary 3. The sequence fgn = TnM(k)g1n=0,decreasing and bounded, there-
fore converges pointwise to its inf, m 2 G (as G is a complete lattice). It
6This implis that c and f ¡ c are both continuous, since f is continuous.
7Although we exploit some limited continuity property of our operator in the separable
case.
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therefore converges uniformly to m (as a consequence of Dini’s theorem). Since
u is continuous and de…ned on a compact domain, it is uniformly continuous,
and u(f(k)¡ k0; gn(k0)) thus converges uniformly to u(f(k)¡ k0; m(k0)). Con-
sequently, supk0fu(f(k) ¡ k0; gn(k0))g converges pointwise to supk0fu(f(k) ¡
k0;m(k0))g. By construction, supk0fu(f(k) ¡ k0; gn(k0))g = gn+1(k) converges
pointwise to m(k); so by uniqueness of the limit, it must be that:
m(k) = sup
k0
fu(f(k)¡ k0; m(k0))g:
If m is another …xed point such that m · m · M(k), then for all n m · m ·
TnM(k) and necessarily m = m. A similar argument applies to the sequence
fAn0g1n=0.
Proposition 4. We use the following theorem, combining several results from
Topkis [13].
Theorem 7 X and T are lattices, S(t) ½ X a compact sublattice of Rn S(t)
increasing in t. Also, for all t 2 T , g(x; t) is supermodular in x 2 S(t), g(x; t)
usc on S(t), and for all t2 · t1 and for all x2 2 S(t2) and x1 2 S(t1),
g(x1; t1) + g(x2; t2) · g(x1 ^ x2; t2) + g(x1 _ x2; t1): (3)
Then argmaxx2S(t) g(x; t) is a nonempty compact and subcomplete sublattice of
Rn and has a greatest and a least element, both increasing in t.
Proof. (i) and (iii) follow from the theorem above, where x = k, t = k0,
S(t) = [0; f(k)] is a compact sublattice of R and increasing in k, and g(x; t) =
uff(k)¡k0; v¤(k0)g is trivially supermodular in k0 and also usc in k0. Condition
(3) above follows from Assumption 2(iv) and the property that v¤ is increasing
in its argument.
(ii) and (iv). See Ray [10] (proof of Lemma 2, page 123-124).
(v). Suppose that max¡(bk) = min¡(bk) + ", where " > 0; and max¡(k)
continuous at bk. By continuity there must exists a x < bk in a neighborhood
of bk such that max¡(bk) < max¡(x) + ". This implies min¡(bk) < max¡(x)
and contradicts the strong monotonicity of the optimal correspondence. Note,
however, that the correspondence may not be single-valued at the discontinuity
points of the maximum selection (which are upward jumps).
Proposition 6. Existence follows from Tarski’s …xed point theorem, as A can
be shown to be monotone (see Coleman [4]) and to map the complete lattice E
into itself, as discussed in Morand and Re¤ett [9]. Uniqueness follows from the
same argument as in Coleman [5] or Datta, Mirman and Re¤ett [6], implying
that the unique equilibrium policy is continuous. The sequence fAnFg1n=0 is
monotone and bounded, and therefore converges pointwise to its inf. Since E is
a complete lattice this inf is continuous, and by Dini’s theorem the convergence
is uniform.
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